- China’s Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Industry and Information Technology proposed adding 12 solar manufacturing technologies to the export-control catalogue under Joint Announcement No. 48 of 2026; public comment is open until November 15.
- The draft targets production know-how, tandem cells at 30%+ efficiency, large-area perovskite modules at 18%+, and tandem modules at 28%+, while shipments of finished panels are explicitly excluded.
- Beijing cites national security, pointing to solar’s growing use in aerospace and defence; manufacturers in the US, India and elsewhere face a new barrier to building next-generation lines outside China.
Beijing has proposed the most aggressive move yet in the clean-energy technology race. The new China solar export controls, published October 16 under Joint Announcement No. 48 of 2026, would add 12 photovoltaic manufacturing technologies to China’s Catalogue of Technologies Prohibited or Restricted from Export, locking advanced production know-how behind licensing walls just as the rest of the world races to build its own solar factories. The draft is open for public consultation until November 15.
The proposal draws its line at the technical frontier rather than today’s factory floor. It would prohibit exports of production processes and related equipment for perovskite-silicon tandem cells built on wafers at least 182 millimeters wide with conversion efficiencies of 30% or higher, plus perovskite slot-die coating processes at widths of 1.1 meters or more. For finished-size modules, the thresholds are large-area (at least one square meter) single-junction perovskite modules at 18% efficiency or above, and large-area tandem modules at 28% or more. Critically, shipments of finished solar panels, even tandem ones, are outside the draft’s scope, according to pv magazine USA.
What the China solar export controls actually catch
Beyond perovskite and tandems, the list reaches deep into the established supply chain: cold-hydrogenation fluidized-bed processes for trichlorosilane used in polysilicon, silane-based fluidized-bed processes above a minimum capacity, silicon-wafer processes for wafers no thicker than 70 micrometers, polysilicon plant engineering services for large production lines, and crystal-pulling, wafer-cutting and TOPCon, back-contact and heterojunction cell manufacturing processes. The solar measures sit inside a broader consultation covering roughly 40 technologies across solar energy, artificial intelligence and biomedicine.
| Technology | Threshold | Proposed status |
|---|---|---|
| Perovskite-silicon tandem cells on ≥182 mm wafers | ≥30% efficiency | Prohibited |
| Perovskite slot-die coating processes | ≥1.1 m width | Prohibited |
| Large-area (≥1 m²) single-junction perovskite modules | ≥18% efficiency | Prohibited |
| Large-area tandem modules | ≥28% efficiency | Prohibited |
| Advanced crystalline-silicon cells (TOPCon, HJT, XBC) | n/a | Restricted, not prohibited |
| Polysilicon and wafer processes (cold hydrogenation, fluidized bed, ≤70 μm wafers, crystal pulling, wafer cutting) | n/a | Listed; status not detailed in reporting |
| Finished solar panels, including tandems | n/a | Outside scope |
The split matters. Technologies proposed for outright prohibition include the frontier perovskite and tandem processes, while advanced crystalline-silicon cell technologies, TOPCon, HJT and XBC, would be restricted but not prohibited, Reuters reports. An interim pre-export registration requirement for companies planning to export listed technologies reportedly took effect on October 16, ahead of the comment-period outcome.
The thresholds sit exactly at the research frontier
This is the detail that makes the proposal strategically sharp. The efficiency thresholds are not set at mass-production levels: they sit where researchers are only now operating. UNSW and UtmoLight set a 23.5% efficiency record for a large-area perovskite module earlier this month, illustrating how tightly bunched the leading edge of this technology still is. A 28% threshold for large-area tandem modules and 30% for tandem cells on commercial-size wafers captures exactly the territory where pilot lines and licensing deals are being negotiated today.
Joule Post has tracked how fast this frontier is moving: our coverage of a perovskite-silicon tandem cell reaching 30.77% efficiency via a healing treatment and a prussian-blue-assisted perovskite cell at 26.9% efficiency shows the research pipeline pressing directly against these thresholds. By pegging controls at frontier performance rather than today’s shipping specs, Beijing is guarding the next generation of manufacturing rather than the current one.
National-security framing, Tesla, and India
The ministries cite national security as the rationale, pointing to the growing use of photovoltaic technology in aerospace, defence and other sensitive applications. The announcement states the controls do not target any specific country, region or company, and that technologies below the thresholds and finished products are outside scope. The ministry said the restrictions aim to “guard against the risks of technologies from running out of control or being improperly disseminated, while safeguarding normal international exchanges and cooperation in science and technology.”
The timing is not happening in a vacuum. Chinese officials held initial talks with manufacturers about potential curbs on advanced solar-panel manufacturing technologies back in April, Reuters reported at the time, a move that could threaten plans by US firms such as Tesla to expand production in the US. Beijing has also curbed exports of solar-manufacturing technology to India as New Delhi tries to build domestic manufacturing and reduce reliance on China. And the intellectual-property fight over exactly these architectures is already underway: First Solar is suing JA Solar and a Corning-operated US plant over TOPCon cell patents.
The opposite of tariffs: taxing knowledge at the factory door
The crucial distinction for US readers: these controls are the opposite of tariffs. Tariffs tax finished goods at the border; this proposal taxes knowledge at the factory door. China still wants to sell the world its panels: September exports fell 6.4% year-on-year to 1.21 million metric tons, but their value rose 19.4% to $3.34 billion. Beijing is fine with modules flowing outward; what it wants to keep home is the ability to make the next generation of them.
That puts US solar manufacturing ambitions in a double bind. Domestic factories are already operating in a market where US solar module prices have jumped more than 40% since Section 232 tariffs took hold, and onshoring advanced lines, Tesla’s planned US expansion, India’s manufacturing push, European gigafactories, now faces a second wall: licensing denials or delays on the equipment and process know-how itself, on top of whatever tariffs apply to the hardware. The most exposed players are equipment makers, engineering-services firms and any manufacturer with cross-border supply relationships built on Chinese-origin perovskite and tandem production technology.
One caveat keeps this from being a done deal: the measure is still a draft. The practical bite depends on what survives the comment period, companies have until November 15 to respond, and how strictly any final version is enforced. The ministries have not said when a final rule might be published or take effect. But the direction is unambiguous. China dominated solar by mastering process knowledge; it has now formally proposed treating that knowledge as a strategic asset on par with AI models and biotech. For anyone betting on a diversified global solar supply chain, the clock on the comment period is the clock that matters.
